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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is on appeal from a judgment entered against Ruben Gaytan on
his guilty plea to felony lewd conduct with a minor. Gaytan timely appeals the
district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The district court sentenced Ruben Gaytan to a fixed term of eight years
followed by 17 years indeterminate for felony lewd conduct with a minor. (R., p.
109.) The victim is Gaytan's 14 year old daughter, V.G. (PSI, p. 2.) Gaytan was
arrested for the offense November 12, 2011. (PSI, pp. 1-2.)
On that date, around 2:00 a.m., Sergeant Chris Siems of the Meridian
Police Department was patrolling the Cayuse Creek subdivision near Linder
Road.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 16; p. 11, L. 25-p. 12, L. 6.) Siems regularly

patrolled the area for known "vandalism, curfew violations, [and] car burglaries."
(2/1/12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 11-13; p. 13, Ls. 15-23.) Siems saw a parked white SUV,
drove toward it, and shined his spotlight on the SUV. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 115.)
When Siems shined his spotlight, two figures "popped up" in the second
row of the SUV. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-7.) Siems described the two as a shirtless dark-haired male with goatee, and dark-haired female. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 16,
Ls. 3-21.) Siems testified that they looked shocked or surprised. (2/1/12 Tr., p.
17, L. 20 - p. 18, L. 13.) Siems turned on his flashing lights so they knew he
was law enforcement.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-4.)
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Siems approached to

investigate whether there was any activity violating curfew, drug, or alcohol
ordinances.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 8-17.) As he approached, Siems saw the

man jump to the back of the vehicle, and observed that the man was naked.
(2/1/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 2-8.)
Siems then got out of his car, walked over to the SUV and knocked on the
window.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 18-20.) From there, he could see the female,

holding a shirt to her chest, but also wearing no clothing. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 21, L. 20
- p. 22, L. 1.) After Siems knocked on the window, the female opened the door.
(2/1/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 2-4.) When asked, the female told Siems that she was 14.
(2/1/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 21-22.) Siems saw that the man had completely covered
himself with a blanket in the back of the SUV. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 13-18.)
Siems commanded the man to come out and show his hands, and asked
the girl what she was doing there. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 25, L. 6 - p. 27, L. 7.) The girl
responded that she was waiting for her father. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 26, L. 16.) The
man wriggled around, apparently trying to put jeans on, and not verbally
responding.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 7-22.) After the man got his jeans on, he

popped his head up and asked what was going on, telling Siems that the girl was
his daughter. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 16-20.) The girl confirmed that the man was
her father. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 22-23.)
Siems had the girl get out of the SUV after putting on some clothes.
(2/1/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 1-6.)

By then, an officer arrived to assist Siems; she

helped the girl into her car. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 15-17.) Siems saw an 18-pack
of Bud Light beer cans in the SUV.

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 13-14.) The man
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appeared to reach for something, despite Siems' direction to keep his hands
where Siems could see them; Siems grabbed the man and pulled him out of the
SUV. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 14-20.) Siems could smell alcohol on the man's
breath. (2/1 /12 Tr., p. 22-24.)
Siems took the man's driver's license from the SUV's glove box; it
identified him as Ruben Gaytan. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 5-19.) Siems handcuffed
Gaytan (2/1/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 7-8), and had Gaytan and his daughter transported
to the Meridian Police Department (PSI, p. 2). There, V.G. disclosed two prior
incidents of sexual intercourse.

(PSI, p. 2.)

A medical examination of V.G.

found lacerations consistent with acute sexual assault. (PSI, p. 2.)
Gaytan was indicted on three counts of lewd conduct with a minor, for
three separate incidents in November 2011. (R., pp. 20-21.) Gaytan moved to
suppress all evidence gathered by law enforcement in its investigation. (R., pp.
46-49.) Following an evidentiary hearing, at which Sergeant Siems testified, the
district court denied Gaytan's motion.

(2/1/12 Tr.; R., pp. 84-89.)

Gaytan

entered a conditional guilty plea which permitted him to appeal the order denying
his suppression motion. (R, p. 99.) He now appeals accordingly.
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ISSUES

Gaytan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gaytan's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gaytan failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Gaytan Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Gaytan's appeal is limited to challenging the district court's order denying

his motion to suppress. As discussed below, Gaytan fails to show that Sergeant
Siems lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain Gaytan and investigate.
Accordingly, Gaytan fails to meet his burden of proving the district court erred in
denying his suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a district court order granting or denying a suppression motion

is bifurcated. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 592, 261 P.3d 853, 869 (2011)
(citation omitted).

First, the appellate court accepts the trial court's factual

findings "unless they are clearly erroneous."

kl

Then, regarding application of

the law to those facts, the appellate court exercises free review.

kl

Determinations regarding witness credibility and the weight to be given
competing evidence at the suppression hearing are within the trial court's
discretion.

State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, _, 291 P.3d 44, 53 (Ct. App.

2012) (citations omitted).

C.

Gaytan Has Failed To Show That Sergeant Siems Lacked A Reasonable
Suspicion To Detain Him And Investigate
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches

and seizures.

Fourth Amendment; Idaho Const., art. I, § 17. However, under

the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement may stop and detain a suspect where
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there are "specific articulable facts" justifying a suspicion that the "detained
person is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Johnson,
152 Idaho 56, 59,266 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Terryv. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
To be valid, the suspicion on which an investigatory stop is based must be
more than "a mere hunch." Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164 (citing
Terry, 395 U.S. at 27). But the required quantity and quality of information is less
than that needed to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330 (1990); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).
In evaluating the validity of an investigatory detention, the reviewing court looks
to the "totality of circumstances" known to the arresting officer at the time.
Johnson, 152 Idaho at 59, 266 P.3d at 1164 (citation omitted).
The parties do not dispute the facts - established by the district court - on
which Sergeant Siems' stop of Gaytan was based. Rather, Gaytan challenges
the district court's legal conclusion that Siems had a justifiable suspicion criminal
activity was afoot. The agreed facts fail to support Gaytan's argument.
The agreed facts include: Sergeant Siems was patrolling the area where
Gaytan's SUV was parked for illegal activity. (2/1 /12 Tr., p. 10, L. 16; p. 11, L. 25
- p. 12, L. 6.) The area was known for criminal activity, including vandalism,
curfew violations, and car burglaries. (2/1 /12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 11-13; p. 13, Ls. 1523.) When Siems saw Gaytan's parked SUV, he drove toward it, shining his
spotlight. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-15.) Siems then saw two figures "pop up" in
the second row of the SUV, looking startled. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-7; p. 17, L.
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20 - p. 18, L. 13.) Siems noticed that one was a shirt-less man, and the other
was a dark-haired female (age indeterminate).

(2/1/12 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 3-21.)

Siems then approached to investigate further, turning on his flashing lights to
signify he was law enforcement. (2/1/12 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-4.)
The district court judge held that, at that point, Siems "had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the parties were engaged or were about to engage
in criminal activity" or that there was a violation of state law concerning indecent
exposure (I.C. § 18-4116), curfew (I.C. § 20-549), or fornication (I.C. § 18-6603),
or a violation of a Meridian ordinance against being in a community park after
sunset. (R., pp. 87-89.)
Idaho's indecent exposure law provides that it is a misdemeanor to
expose one's genitals in a public place, or in the presence of one offended or
annoyed thereby. I.C. § 18-4116. Gaytan argues that there is no evidence that
Siems knew any genitals were exposed. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) This argument
ignores the legal standard for an investigatory detention, which requires less than
is needed for probable cause. White, 496 U.S. at 330; Bishop. 146 Idaho at 811,
203 P.3d at 1210. Siems need not have observed genitalia to warrant further
investigation for indecent exposure; Gaytan's bare torso was enough.
Gaytan also argues that the interior of Gaytan's SUV was not a public
place, nor is there evidence that anyone was annoyed or offended by a display
of genitals.

Although there is no Idaho case law on the subject, jurisdictions

outside of Idaho are split regarding whether one's car is a "public place" for
purposes of indecent exposure laws.

Compare State v. Cutro, 37 Conn. App.
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534, 657 A.2d 239 (1995), and People v. Lino, 447 Mich. 567, 527 N.W.2d 434
(1994) (car or truck in parking lot was public place), with Com. v. Ferguson, 384
Mass. 13, 422 N.E.2d 1365 (1981) and State v. Culmsee, 91 Or. App. 63, 754
P.2d 11 (1988) (car not public place).

Given the uncertainty in case law,

Gaytan's argument that there was no suspicious activity fails.

The fact that

Gaytan's bare torso was exposed from his SUV in a public parking lot provided
reasonable suspicion to further investigate whether criminal activity was in
progress.
Idaho's curfew statute provides enforcement for county or municipal
curfew ordinances for juvenile offenders. I.C. § 20-549. Again, Gaytan argues
the facts do not establish that Siems knew that either person in the car was a
juvenile. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Again, reasonable suspicion to detain does not
require this. The articulable facts that there were two individuals in a parked car
at 2:00 a.m. in a public area known for illegal activity was enough for Siems to
investigate further.
Idaho's

fornication

law provides that

sexual

intercourse

between

unmarried persons can be punishable by a fine and imprisonment up to six
months.

I.C. § 18-6603.

Gaytan argues that Siems lacked a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that the couple in the vehicle was unmarried or having
intercourse.

The articulable facts support the opposite conclusion: a shirtless

male and female in a parked SUV in the park at 2:00 a.m. provides ample
suspicion - well within reason - for further investigation.
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Finally, Meridian City Code 13-2-6 provides that it is illegal for persons or
vehicles to be in a community park more than one-half hour after sunset. Ord.
03-1031, 7-22-2003, eff. 9-1-2003.

Siems testified at the Grand Jury hearing

that Gaytan was in violation of that code. (See R., p. 88. 1) In its decision, the
district court noted that "it now appears [the] park may not have been [a]
community park," but found, "this would be a factual mistake." (R., p. 88.) In
determining the validity of an investigatory stop, a court must look to the
arresting officer's "reasonable ... belief' based on "the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. This standard
allows for reasonable factual mistakes such as Siems' mistaken belief here.
Regardless of whether the park was actually a community park, the available
facts supported Siems' reasonable suspicion that Gaytan was engaged in illegal
activity. (R., pp. 88-89.)
The Fourth Amendment does not require that law enforcement officers be
certain that a crime has been committed in carrying out their duties. Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990).

Rather, they are expected to act

reasonably, "on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability."
(citation omitted).

Sergeant Siems did so here.

kl

The district court correctly

concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and thus properly
denied Gaytan's suppression motion.

1

In its decision denying the suppression motion, the district court cited the
transcript of the Grand Jury hearing. That transcript is not part of the record
before this Court. Regardless, the district court's analysis of Siems' Grand Jury
testimony is apt.
9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 20th day of February 2013.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of February, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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